Z Machine case: how far can the state decide what a woman is allowed to desire?

**The Z Machine case raises a much deeper question than gang bangs: how far can the state protect a consenting adult from what she herself has chosen to experience?** On 15 July 2026, the Conseil d’État overturned an order that had suspended the administrative closure of the Paris establishment operated by Z Machine, a company that notably organizes group sexual encounters. The decision does not ban gang bangs in France. It also does not convict Z Machine of rape or pimping. It was handed down in summary proceedings, pending a ruling on the merits. But behind this very specific case lies a question that should concern far more people than libertines alone: **Are we really free to decide what we want to do with our own bodies, as long as we are adults, informed and consenting?** Because part of the Conseil d’État’s reasoning deserves to be discussed. ## Protecting consent, of course Let’s start with what should not even be up for debate. A consent form signed at 8 p.m. is not valid permission until midnight, no matter what happens. Since the law of 6 November 2025, French law makes clear that sexual consent must be free, informed, specific, prior **and revocable**. It must be assessed in light of the circumstances. That means someone can want to live out a very intense fantasy. They can choose a BDSM practice. Humiliation. Dominance. A kidnapping scenario. A group experience. They can even want to play with the illusion of total loss of control. But they always retain the real right to say: **“I’m done.”** That is precisely where some elements of the Z Machine case raise a real question. The Conseil d’État notes events bringing together sometimes large groups of men, the possible participation of the organizers themselves, scenarios involving coercion, and certain descriptions even evoking the participant being made to drink excessively. In its view, those conditions were not surrounded by sufficient safeguards to ensure that consent remained truly free, informed and revocable. On that point, it is hard to cry morality police. When a business commercially organizes a sexual experience, asking it to ensure that a person can actually stop what is happening seems not only legitimate, but essential. A safeword that cannot be used is useless. A signed form does not replace living consent. And fantasizing about losing control never means losing the legal right to take control back. ## But the Conseil d’État did not stop there And this is where the case becomes much more disturbing. A few months earlier, the Paris administrative court had suspended the closure of Z Machine. It had notably noted customer testimony and the existence, according to the company, of an organization allowing women to determine the conditions of the experience and ask for it to stop at any time. It therefore considered that there was serious doubt about the argument that these practices would necessarily infringe their dignity. The Conseil d’État considered that this reasoning was not enough. In its view, the judge should have examined whether the very conditions in which certain events were organized could infringe human dignity, **even when the scenario had been accepted by the participants**. And that difference is fundamental. We are no longer only talking about whether someone was truly consenting. We are starting to ask whether some things are so degrading that **consent would no longer be enough to make them acceptable**. That is a far more worrying line to cross. ## Can someone voluntarily be “undignified”? Imagine an adult woman. She knows exactly the fantasy she wants to experience. She asked for it. She knows the participants. She is neither manipulated nor coerced, nor unable to change her mind. She can stop the experience at any time. And her fantasy consists precisely in being dominated, insulted, tied up, symbolically used as an object, or placed at the center of a group sexual experience. That desire may shock. It may seem incomprehensible. It may even make some people deeply uncomfortable. But is it up to the state to explain to her that what she wants to experience is incompatible with **her own dignity**? That is where the reasoning becomes, in our view, extremely problematic. Because if dignity becomes a notion independent of the will of the person concerned, where exactly do we draw the line? A particularly hard BDSM session? A practice of submission? Consensual humiliation? A fantasy of confinement? A carefully framed consensual non-consent scene? A gang bang desired by a woman who precisely wants to be the center of several partners’ attention? At what level of intensity does our sexuality become legally too “undignified” for us to choose it? ## A fantasy does not need to be respectable to be free That may be the heart of the problem. Sexual freedom should not be reserved for practices soft enough, romantic enough or presentable enough to reassure those who do not take part in them. Freedom exists precisely when we also have the right to make choices others do not understand. A woman is not necessarily a victim because her fantasy is violent. She is not necessarily alienated because she likes submission. She does not necessarily need someone to explain what would be good for her because she chooses a sexuality that shocks. And an adult does not lose autonomy simply because their desires do not match society’s idea of respectable sexuality. That is the paradox that emerges behind this case: **in wanting to protect women’s sexual autonomy, we sometimes risk starting by taking away their right to define their own sexuality.** Several feminist organizations involved in the proceedings obviously defend a different reading. They believe that an apparent “yes” is not enough and that context, power relations, possible violence and the conditions in which consent is obtained must be examined. That argument deserves to be heard. Yes: consent must be questioned. Yes: power relations exist. Yes: some people may agree under pressure to what they do not truly want. But recognizing this does not mean that any woman choosing an extreme practice should be suspected of not knowing what she wants. ## Is dignity really the right tool? That is also one of the most interesting criticisms raised around this decision. Law professor Muriel Fabre-Magnan, while considering that one must examine what a person consents to and in what context, has been cautious about using **human dignity** as the basis for limiting a freedom. She prefers much more precise legal notions, such as physical and psychological integrity or inhuman or degrading treatment. The distinction is crucial. Because integrity can be verified. Consent can be framed. Safety can be organized. Real violence can be punished. An inability to say stop can be established. But “dignity”? Who decides what is dignified? The judge? The prefect? The associations? The neighbors? The majority? Or the person who has their own body? The Conseil d’État has given this case a particular precedential interest: in its official analysis, it now indicates that the judge must examine whether the concrete conditions of an activity can **in themselves** infringe human dignity. The decision is listed in the tables of the Recueil Lebon. It would therefore be excessive to claim that nothing happened. ## Z Machine is not “libertinism” Another simplification must also be rejected. This decision does not ban gang bangs. It does not ban BDSM. It does not ban fantasies involving coercion. It does not mean libertine clubs are becoming illegal. The Conseil d’État is examining the **concrete conditions** specific to Z Machine’s activities. Several legal scholars also point out this difference from the famous “dwarf-tossing” case, in which the activity itself was considered contrary to dignity. And some of the practices described in the case file really do justify asking questions about safety and consent. Defending sexual freedom therefore does not require turning Z Machine into an impeccable martyr. That would miss the real debate. The real debate is this: **Should the state prevent someone from enduring what they do not want — or can it also prevent them from living what they truly want?** The first mission is essential. The second should make us extremely cautious. ## Our bodies, our limits… and our fantasies too At WishPride, we defend a simple idea. An adult should be able to talk about their desires without shame. They should be able to have conventional or unsettling fantasies, romantic or raw, gentle or extreme. And as long as the people concerned are adults, informed, truly consenting, able to withdraw consent and protected from violence they did not choose, **we believe the law should leave a very large place for their freedom.** Being free to fantasize never means giving up the right to say stop. But protecting our right to say stop should not become the pretext for telling us what we are allowed to desire. A free society must be able to hold both ideas at once. **No one can decide for us that we consented.** But no one should too easily decide for us that what we freely chose is “undignified” for us. Because deep down, the Z Machine case may raise a much more important question than gang bangs: **Who should have the final word on a woman’s sexual dignity?** The state? Or herself? #consent #sexualfreedom